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The Payment In Lieu of Taxes Act: A
Legislative Response to Federal Tax
Immunity
I.

Introduction

A.

The FederalPresence and Its Impact on Local Government

The power to tax is undeniably necessary to the functioning of
government.' Since state and local governments exercise taxing
power concurrently with the federal government,2 state and local
taxing power is limited.3 One major constraint is the prohibition
against taxation of the federal government and its property without
congressional consent.4
Federal real property holdings are vast- and it is unlikely that
1. Discussing the importance of the taxing power, Alexander Hamilton noted:
Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body politic; as
that which sustains its life and motion, and enables it to perform its most essential
functions. A complete power, therefore, to procure a regular and adequate supply of
it, as far as the resources of the community will permit, may be regarded as an indispensable ingredient in every constitution.
THE FEDERALIST No. 30 at 182-83 (A. Hamilton) (Bicentennial ed. 1976).
2. Id No. 32 at 195 (the power to tax is "manifestly a concurrent and coequal authority
in the United States and in the individual States"). Local governments derive their power to
tax from the state. See generally J. MAXWELL & J. ARONSON, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS (3d ed. 1977).
3. An explicit constitutional limitation upon the taxing power of states is the import and
export clause:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties
on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its
inspection Laws; and the net Produce of all Duties and Imports, laid by any State on
Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all
such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, para. 2.
Alexander Hamilton argued that this constitutional limitation upon the states' taxing
power implies an admission that, if this clause were not in the Constitution, the states would
possess the power to tax imports and exports. Further, it implies that as to all other taxes, the
taxing power of the states is undiminished. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 32 at 195.
4. "[Ulnshaken, rarely questioned... is the principle that possessions, institutions, and
activities of the Federal Government itself in the absence of express congressional consent are
not subject to any form of state taxation." United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174,
177 (1944).
5. The federal government currently owns 775.3 million acres, more than one-third of
the United States' total land area. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, AN EXAMINATION OF PAYMENTS IN-LIEU OF TAXES FOR FEDERAL REAL PROPERTY
(June 1980) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY COMMISSION]. This figure does not include floor

area, installations and various other buildings and facilities. Id ch. I at I. Two principal
categories of public open space land, public domain and acquired, have been defined as follows:

they will decrease. 6 The tax immunity of these lands creates fiscal
burdens for subnational governments whose tax bases are eroded by
the federal presence. Local governments are particularly susceptible
to the adverse impact of tax-immune federal land. Local governments are "open economies" 7 and therefore rely heavily on real estate taxation' to fulfill revenue needs. Because alternative sources of
funds are needed to compensate for the federal presence, private
holdings may be taxed at the maximum rate allowed by state law. 9
The net effect is that local private landowners subsidize the provision
of services to federal property" ° if the United States does not contribute to local coffers."I Increased demands for local government services,12 combined with the serious effects of inflation,' 3 create
perplexing problems of intergovernmental fiscal policy.' 4 Thus, in
The public domain lands are those that were acquired by the Federal Government through cession, purchase, etc., were never used for non-federal purposes, and
have never left federal ownership; the term acquired lands is used to designate those
lands that have been acquired by the United States from non-federal owners within
the United States even if such lands may have originally been public domain that
passed into non-federal ownership before being reacquired by the United States.
Pearl, The Public Land Law Review Commission: An Overview, 6 LAND AND WATER L. REV.
29, n.56 (1970).
The distinction between the two types of federal open space land is significant for tax
immunity purposes, because the impact of the removal of acquired lands from local tax rolls
has a direct fiscal effect upon local economies that is more traumatic than the preservation of
the tax immunity of original public domain lands. See note 137 and accompanying text infra.
6. Hearings On HR. 9719 Before The Subcommittee On InteriorAnd Insular Affairs to
Providefor Certain Payments to be made to State or Local Governments by the Secretary of The
Interior Based Upon the Amount of CertainPublic Lands within the Boundariesof such State or
Locality, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings] (statement of
Clark A. Buckler) ("There is no indication that the number of land holdings of the federal
government will decrease; indeed, it appears that additional millions of acres of public domain
land may be added to federal holdings with few transfers of federal property to private ownership").
7. "An open economy is characterized by a high degree of mobility of goods and factor
movements across jurisdictional borders, activities which a local government cannot constrain." ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 5, ch. I at 21 n.2.
8. See 1975 Hearings,supra note 6, at 59 (statement of Lloyd Nesseth) (95% of local tax
revenues derived from property taxes).
9. See S. REP. No. 94-1262, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5968, 5973 (twelve of seventeen counties in Utah tax private property at the
maximum rate allowable under law).
10. The services provided by local governments "include law enforcement; search, rescue
and emergency; public health; sewage disposal; library; hospital; recreation ..
." Id. at 5972.
Ii. Federal tax immunity, which results in the subsidy of the federal government by
private landowners, violates the generally accepted public finance principle that similarly situated taxpayers should be required to carry equal tax burdens. See generally P. POSTLEWAITE,
POLICY READINGS IN INDIVIDUAL TAXATION (1980). The revenue loss to state and local trea-

suries caused by the presence of federal property within their jurisdictions has been estimated
at $3.7 billion in fiscal year 1978. This estimate excludes the open space lands with which the
1976 PILOT Act deals. ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 5, ch. 1 at 21.
12. See 122 CONG. REC. 17751 (1976) (from 1950 to 1972 total state and local expenditures for public services increased from $20 billion to $166 billion).
13. Id at 8380.
14. See 1975 Hearings,supra note 6 at 225 (statement of Mr. Steiger) ("What we have is
literally 100 years of inequity geometrically compounded over the past 20 years because of the
distinction in land values and because of excessive pressures for local political subdivisions to
seek sources of revenue").

recent years Congress has acted affirmatively to correct the inequity.
B.

Legislative Responses

A typical legislative response to the problems caused by federal
tax immunity is to compensate affected governments through federal6
fiscal aid programs. I5 The two basic programs are revenue sharing
and payments in lieu of taxes. 7 These payment systems have developed over a long period of time' 8 and in a haphazard fashion. In
response to the programs' perceived inadequacies,' 9 Congress enacted the Payment In Lieu of Taxes Act of 1976 (PILOT).20 This
Act represents a decisive step in the direction of providing minimum
payments to local governments to compensate for the federal presence. It was preceded by years of debate, 2 ' studies22 and recommendations from government commissions that legislation of its type be
implemented.23
The PILOT Act is the culmination of an affirmative congressional role in the formation of tax immunity doctrine and federal
land policy. The congressional position was accompanied by a
deemphasis of judicial determination of the tax immunity doctrine,24
and executive determination of land management policy. 25 Although the PILOT Act is an imperfect solution 26 to a politically sen15. See ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 5, ch. I at 35 ("In fiscal 1980 the U.S. gov").
ernment will provide $82.9 billion in grants-in-aid. . . to state and local governments ..
16. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 711 (1976) (provides for payments to certain states of "5 per
").
centum of the net proceeds of sales of all public lands lying within their limits ..
17. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 577g (1976) (provides for payments to Minnesota of.75% of the
appraised value of national forest lands).
18. The first revenue sharing statutes were enacted as early as 1819, and provided for
payments to states upon their admission to the union. The new states received a percentage of
the funds raised from the sale of public domain land lying within their territory. See Act of
March 2, 1819, ch. XLVII, § 6, 3 Stat. 489 (1819).
19. See S. REP. No. 94-1262, supra note 9, at 5971-73.
20. Payment In Lieu of Taxes Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-565, 90 Stat. 2662 (codified at
31 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1607 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
21. For an excellent discussion of congressional consideration of payments in lieu of
taxes legislation prior to passage of the 1976 PILOT Act, see Van Cleve, States' Rights and
FederalSolvency, 1959 Wis. L. REV. 190, 215-22.
22. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS. THE ADEQUACY OF FEDERAL COMPENSATION To LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR TAX EXEMPT FEDERAL

LANDS 32-39 (July 1978) for a discussion of formal studies on payments in lieu of taxes.
23. In 1969 the Joint Economic Commission recommended that PILOT legislation be
instituted by Congress for all government-owned property. Joint Economic Committee, Joint
Economic Committee Report on the 1969 Economic Report of the President (1969).
24. See notes 41-51 and accompanying text infra.
25. In 1964, Congress established the Public Land Law Review Commission (PLLRC) to
undertake a "comprehensive review of the policies applicable to the use, management, and
disposition of the public domain lands of the United States." S. REP. No. 1444, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. reprintedin [1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3741, 3741. A major impetus for the
formation of the PLLRC was congressional concern with the lack of legislative guidance given
to the executive branch for the effective management of federal lands. Id at 3743.
26. The regulations issued by the Department of the Interior do not adequately implement the Act. See notes 142-48 and accompanying text infra.. Congress provided guidance in
1976, with enactment of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90

sitive issue of fiscal federalism, it is a long overdue attempt to solve a
complex problem.
This comment analyzes the PILOT Act's provisions and the regulations promulgated by the executive branch to implement the payment program. A comprehensive understanding of the Act
necessitates a preliminary review of the basis of tax immunity, the
environment in which legislative responses to the doctrine emerged,
and the inadequacy of the programs preceding the 1976 Act.
II.

Background of PILOT Legislation

A.

JudicialBases of Tax Immunity

The basis of the doctrine of federal tax immunity is a recognition of the potentially destructive nature of taxation2 7 within our
dual system of government.2 8 McCulloch v. Maryland29 established
an absolute immunity doctrine3" out of concern that oppressive state
or local taxation would hinder the pursuit of legitimate federal
goals.3 Chief Justice Marshall found the underlying rationale for
32
federal tax immunity in the supremacy clause:
[T]he States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard,
impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operation of the
Constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution
the powers vested in the general government. This is, we think,
the unavoidable consequence of that Supremacy which the Constitution has declared.3 3
Stat. 2743 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1781) (Supp. I 1978). The Act contains explicit
guidelines for land use policy and procedure. Id §§ 201-214, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1711-1722. The
power of the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw land for federal purposes is subjected to
close congressional scrutiny. Id. § 204, 43 U.S.C. § 1714.
27. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819) ("[T]he power to tax
").
involves the power to destroy ..
are
28. "[Clonflicts between the power to tax and the right to be free from taxation ...
inevitable where two governments function at the same time and in the same territory".
United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 175 (1944).
29. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
30. Cases following McCulloch construed the immunity as absolute despite Chief Justice
Marshall's dictum that a tax upon the real property of a federal instrumentality would not
necessarily be unconstitutional. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436. The tax that was invalidated in
McCulloch was a tax on the operations of a federal instrumentality. Id In Van Brocklin v.
Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886), taxes on federal real property were invalidated.
31. Congress possesses power to exempt its constitutionally created instrumentalities
from taxation and avoid judicial determination of immunity. City of Cleveland v. United
States, 323 U.S. 329, 333 (1945); Federal Land Bk. v. Bismarck, 314 U.S. 95, 102 (1941).
32. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
33. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436. Accord, United States v. City of Adair, 539 F.2d 1185 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977).

B.

Expansion of the Tax Immunity Doctrine
In the century following McCulloch, the Supreme Court ex-

panded intergovernmental tax immunity by exempting from state
taxation persons involved in certain governmental operations: contracting,3 4 leasing 35 and employment 36 by the United States. In the
Court's view, because the federal government funds the operations,
state taxation of related personnel would increase the economic burden on those operations. Thus, the State would effectively be taxing,
and consequently impeding federal functions. Reciprocally, the corollary to the Court's rule prohibits federal taxation of state functions. 37 This extension caused Justice Frankfurter to remark that the
doctrine was "moving in the realm of what Lincoln called 'pernicious abstractions.'" 3 8 Judicial expansion of the doctrine ended in
1937 with the Supreme Court opinion in James v. Dravo Contracting
39
Company.
C

JudicialRestriction of the Tax Immunity Doctrine

The Dravo4 court held that increased costs to the federal government would not necessarily invalidate a state tax upon federal
operations.4 The opinion is based on "practical criterion,"42 not on
the abstract notions of federalism once criticized by Justice Frankfurter. Today the basis of the decision is embodied in the "legal incidence" rule.43 Under this rule, taxes whose legal incidence falls on
persons performing federal functions are not invalid even if the result is increased costs to the United States.44
Before the Dravo decision, the increased revenue needs of subnational governments, the expanded federal presence within state
34. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel Knox, 277 U.S. 218 (1928).
35. Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1921).
36. Dobbins v. Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842).
37. Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 113 (1870).
38. Graves v. New York ex re. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 490 (1938) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
39. 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
40. Id.
41. Id at 160. Professor Tribe has suggested, however, that the force of the Dravo decision must be qualified because "the United States agreed in the Supreme Court that the tax
was valid in the absence of congressionally conferred statutory immunity.
... Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities In Litigation, Taxation, and Regulatio" Separation Of Powers Issues
In Controversies 4bout Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 706 (1976).
42. Justice Hughes, writing for the majority, referred to the earlier case of Willcutts v.
Bunn, 282 U.S. 216 (1931), which emphasized the importance of practical effect in ruling upon
the constitutionality of a federal tax on states: "Before the power of the Congress to lay the
excise tax in question can be denied in the view that it imposes a burden upon the States'.. .
it must appear that the burden is real, not imaginary; substantial, not negligible." Id at 234.
43. For a discussion of the legal incidence rule, see Comment, Federal Immunity From
State Taxation: A Reassessment, 45 U. CHi. L. REV. 695 (1978).
44. See United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977); Alabama v. King &
Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941).

borders,4 5 and various forms of taxation had forced the judiciary
into an "ad hoc resolution"' of immunity cases that it perceived as
primarily a legislative function.4 7 Given the authority of Congress to
immunize any property of the United States from taxation in furtherance of a federal goal,4 8 the courts became reluctant to extend
immunity.4 9 One eminent constitutional scholar has described the
current approach of the Supreme Court as "reserving to Congress
the power to adjust the competing fiscal and symbolic claims of federal autonomy and state revenue needs." 5 As the Supreme Court
has narrowed the immunity doctrine, Congress has increased its role
in the determination of policy. The result is that the primary basis
for immunity is statutory.5
The federal government may be taxed whenever congressional
consent is given. Congress has been reluctant to consent to the taxation of federal property5 2 and has left intact the basic concepts of
federalism originated in McCulloch. 13 Direct taxes on the United
States or its property are deemed to be barred by the supremacy
clause,54 and Congress may waive 55 or grant 56 the tax immunity of
federal property or instrumentalities. Absent congressionally
granted immunity, the tax status of persons related to federal functions is judicially determined by the legal incidence doctrine. 7
Congress, therefore, is the ultimate formulator of intergovernmental tax immunity policy. The PILOT Act signals the development of an equitable system of compensation to subnational
governments for the presence of tax-immune federal open space
45. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
46. Agricultural Bk. v. Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 352 (1967) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
47. "Wise and flexible adjustment of intergovernmental tax immunity calls for political
and economic considerations of the greatest difficulty and delicacy. Such complex problems
are ones which Congress is best qualified to resolve." United States v. City of Detroit, 355
U.S. 466, 474 (1958).
48. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
49. 392 U.S. 339, 352 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
50. Tribe, supra note 41, at 711.
51. See ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 5, ch. 2 at 6.
52. Congress has limited its consent to taxation of "federally owned corporations, federal
credit and banking institutions, and properties which are temporarily held by the federal government pending disposition to private owners." ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 5, ch. II
at 6.
53. At least one commentator has suggested that cogent policy reasons, as well as judicial
precedent, support retention of the immunity doctrine. See Hellerstein, State Taxation andthe
Supreme Court. Towarda More UnfledApproach to ConstitutionalAdudication 75 MICH. L.
REV. 1426 (1977). Professor Hellerstein contends that the unavailability of traditional remedies to enforce collection of delinquent taxes against the United States, and the inadequacy of
standard assessment techniques to value government property make an overhaul of the immunity doctrine unlikely. Id at 1454 & n. 160.
54. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
55. The first congressional waiver of immunity was the authorization to tax real property
owned by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act,
ch. 8, § 10, 47 Stat. 5 (1932).
56. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
57. See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra.

lands within local jurisdictions, rather than the authorization of direct application of local property taxes to these lands. The challenge
facing Congress was to devise a system that maintains the federal
supremacy exemplified by the immunity doctrine and protects the
equally important objective of preserving a fiscally sound and effective local body politic."
III.

Specific Payments Programs

Congress has long recognized its responsibility to reduce the
burdens imposed by the federal presence on local tax bases.5 9 The
two principal forms of payment programs designed to lessen these
burdens are revenue sharing and payment in lieu of taxes statutes.
A4.

Revenue Sharing Statutes.

The major purpose of revenue sharing programs is to distribute
federal revenues derived from governmental operations on tax-immune lands to the subnational government in which the lands are
situated. Twenty-five different revenue sharing programs exist.6"
Sharing revenue received from mineral, 6 ' grazing 62 or forest 63 land is
the most common system, but monies received from leasing" and
licensing6 5 activities may also be distributed.
The current revenue sharing program consists of an aimless array of inadequately formulated statutes. The system lacks design
and coordination because the programs are administered through
several different federal agencies6 6 with no apparent interagency
connections. Revenue sharing programs were the first legislative response to the tax immunity issue and have developed over a protracted period of time,67 which has contributed to the system's
58. Federal tax immunity militates against effective local government for it is a "clear
violation of the principle of home rule control over local own-source revenues since the federal
government essentially mandates the local exemption to itself." ADVISORY COMMISSION,
supra note 5, ch. I at 50.
59. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
60. For a comprehensive listing of present revenue sharing statutes, see ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 5, ch. II at 20-26.
61. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 191 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (mandates shared royalties resulting from the development of mineral resources).
62. 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1976) (mandates shared receipts from grazing on public domain
lands).
63. 16 U.S.C. § 500 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (provides for payments out of revenues from
national forest lands).
64. 16 U.S.C. § 695m (1976) (25% of revenues received from the leasing of national wildlife refuge lands is shared with counties in which the lands are located).
65. 16 U.S.C. § 810 (1976) (37 1/2% of revenues received by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for licensing of hydroelectric projects is returned to the states containing the
projects).
66. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1012 (1976) (Department of Agriculture); 16 U.S.C. § 810 (1976
& Supp. III 1979) (Department of Energy); 16 U.S.C. § 8311 (1976) (Tennessee Valley Authority); 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1976) (Department of The Interior).
67. The major revenue sharing statutes were enacted between 1908 and 1934, but were

haphazard appearance.
Weaknesses in the revenue sharing concept cause it to fail its
essential purpose - to remedy the adverse fiscal effects of federal tax
immunity. The most glaring problem is that much federal land produces little or no revenue.6 8 Only one-half of federal land actually
generates income.6 9 Although limiting compensation to lands that
produce revenue is fiscally prudent, this policy is not justified by any
significant difference in the lands effect on the local government fisc.
Both kinds of federal land diminish local tax bases and both receive
services at the expense of local taxpayers.
Revenue levels are unpredictable,7 ° and therefore cannot be determined accurately or implemented by local governments in budget
planning. Revenue yields also vary from one federal enclave to another, resulting in disparate payments among recipients.7 ' Additionally, some federal lands are limited in the scope of their incomeproducing enterprises.72 The discretionary power of federal land
management agencies to classify land affects revenue yield and the
level of income to be shared. This power can inadvertently frustrate
congressional intent to compensate local governments via revenue
sharing programs.7 3
The percentages of total receipts from federal enterprises that
are paid to subnational governments may vary greatly among statutes" and among recipients under the same statute.7 5 The amounts
preceded by statutes that shared revenue with states as they were admitted to the union. See
ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 22, at 19-20.

68. See 122 CONG. REC. 8391 (1976) (remarks of Congressman Alexander) (no revenue
sharing payments are made for 24.8 million acres in the national park system or for 9.6 million
acres in the national wilderness system).
69. S. REP. No. 94-1262, supra note 9, at 5971 (in 1966, out of a total of 725 million acres
of federal lands, 363 million acres produced revenue).
70. "[M]anagement decisions of the various Federal land management agencies can
often quite suddenly reduce or eliminate the revenue or fee-generating activities on the public
lands within [a] State or local governments' jurisdictions." Id
71. Three counties in eastern Oregon received only about $16,500 in revenues in fiscal
year 1968, but the timber rich counties of western Oregon received $21 million in 1966. Muys,
A View of the FLLRC Report's Recommendations Concerning Finances, 6 LAND AND WATER
L. REV. 411, 414-15 (1970).
72. Land within the national wilderness preservation system, for example, may entertain
commercial enterprises "only to the extent necessary for activities which are proper for realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes of the areas." 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) (6) (1976).
These restrictions on use have been held to prohibit mining activities. Izzak Walton League of

Am. v. St. Clair, 353 F. Supp. 698, 714 (D. Minn.), rey'd on administrative and procedural
grounds, 497 F.2d 849, 853 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974). But see Minnesota
Pub. Int. Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.), stay denied, 429 U.S. 935 (1976)
(logging in virgin forest area is not prohibited).
73. The possibility of thwarting congressional intent by executive department decisions is
lessened by the guidelines contained in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976.
See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
74. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 8311 (1976) (5% of revenues shared) with 33 U.S.C. § 701c-3
(1976) (75% of revenues shared).
75. See, e.g., The Mineral Lands Leasing Act, which provides for payments to Alaska of
90% of receipts, and payments to other states of 50% of receipts. 30 U.S.C. § 191 (1976).

received bear no apparent relation to the market value of the land,7 6
the number of acres utilized," the tax structure of the locality, 78 the
different burdens imposed by different functions,7 9 or the rapidly rising demand for services. Although some statutes were enacted with
80
the specific legislative intent to compensate for lost tax revenue,
funds received do not correspond to the potential recovery from ad
valorem property taxation.8 Benefits may flow from the federal
presence and militate against full tax equivalency payments, but

there is no evidence that benefits are computed in payment formulations.82
Additionally, the revenue sharing statutes exhibit little congressional concern with intergovernmental comity, because they often
deprive local government recipients of fiscal decision-making power
and substitute federal judgment. Statutes may restrict the use of
83
payments to application toward schools and road maintenance,
when the funds might be more efficiently utilized in other areas.
Furthermore, funds may never reach the affected local government
because statutes often make states the original recipients of payments
and do not mandate that the monies be forwarded to the appropriate
76. See 1975 Hearings,supra note 6, at 181 (remarks of Congressman Evans). The emphasis in revenue sharing statutes is on the income that is generated, not the market value of
the land itself. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1012 (1976) (25% of net revenues paid to counties containing certain submarginal lands).
77. 1975 Hearings,supra note 6 at 181 (remarks of Congressman Evans).
78. 122 CONG. REC. 8380 (1976) (remarks of Mr. Quillen) (present revenue sharing statutes do not reflect current revenue needs of local units of government or lost tax revenues).
79. 1975 Hearings,supra note 6 at 42 (remarks of Mr. Buzianis) (federal lands vary in the
amount of local services they require for maintenance).
80. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 701c-3 (1976), which provides for sharing of funds received
from the leasing of flood control lands and which was "enacted to provide some measure of
compensation to the local taxing units for the loss of taxes which results when lands acquired
by the Federal Government for flood-control purposes are removed from the local tax rolls."
S. REP. No. 151, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. reprintedin [1953] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1683,
1683.
When the intent of Congress is not explicitly stated, the question of whether a payments
program is or is not in lieu of taxes may be a crucial one. In Georgia Pac. Corp. v. County of
Mendocino, 357 F. Supp. 380, 387 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd, 515 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1974), the
court found that revenues shared with local governments from national forest timber sales
were not in lieu of taxes and therefore the taxation by local governments of possessory interests
in the timber was not impermissible double taxation. See also Board of Supervisors v. Archer,
18 Cal. App. 3d 717, 725, 96 Cal. Rptr. 379, 385 (1971) (payments made under the Taylor
Grazing Act are not in lieu of taxes).
81. See 122 CONG. REC. 17750 (1976) (remarks of Senator Haskell) (In 1975, $2.6 million
was returned to Colorado to compensate for federal land tax immunity, whereas $50 million
could have been realized if the 1974 average county property tax rate had been applied to
federal land).
82. The measurement of benefits to localities from federal land is a difficult, if not impossible, task and any adjustment in payment amount would be arbitrary. Even if benefits could
be measured, there is no reason to reduce payments to localities. Benefits flow to local governments from the presence of privately-owned land as well as from federally-owned land. It is
illogical to have the value of benefits deducted from federal payments when no deduction is
made from the ad valorem property taxes paid by the private sector. See generally ADVISORY
COMMISSION, supra note 22, at 132-33.
83. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1012 (1976).

local government unit.84 Thus, the possible retention of payments by
states and limitations on payment use cause revenue sharing programs to fail to replace lost tax revenue and to remedy problems of
eroded local tax bases and concomitant loss of fiscal self-determination.
One further defect of revenue sharing is its adverse impact on
land management policies. Since receipt of revenue is dependent
upon production, there is a built-in incentive to exploit natural resources. 85 Consequently, conservation groups and local governments are in opposition when the government opposes an
environmentally beneficial program for the sole reason that the program reduces revenue yield.8 6
B.

Payments In Lieu of Taxes Statutes

1. The Development of the PILOT Concept. -Payments in lieu
of taxes are made to state and local governments containing federal
land that generates insufficient or no revenue. Characteristically, PILOT programs are the product of the era of vast land acquisition by
the federal government in the second half of this century. 87 Since
the acquired lands were once subject to local taxation and became
immune after acquisition, the impetus to provide payments specifically to replace the lost taxes was greater than if the land had always
been federally owned.88 The withdrawal of previously taxed land
accentuated sensitive areas of intergovernmental fiscal policy and
emphasized the unique legislative and political questions that tax
immunity presents. States opposing the congressional grant of certain types of tax immunity effectively lobbied for the repeal of some
immunity provisions.8 9 Congress was required to balance the states'
84. The following statement was made by a representative of the National Association of
Counties in response to a question concerning the distribution of revenue under the Mineral
Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 191 (1976):
Funds received under the Mineral Leasing Act totaled approximately $4.5 million for Montana fin 1975]. Approximately 50% of these funds go to the state superintendent of public instruction for deposit in the state permanent education trust
fund. The other 50% is allocated to the state department of highways for use in its
general operating budget. County government in Montana receives no percentage of
these funds.
ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 22, at 165.

85. See Muys, supra note 71, at 415 (the Public Land Law Review Commission recommended that land use decisions be divorced from intergovernmental fiscal considerations to
"relieve pressures to maximize revenues from market-oriented items to the detriment of important non-market programs").
86. See 122 CONG. REC. 17747 (remarks of Senator Jackson) ("Time and again [the
Committee On Interior and Insular Affairs] has experienced local government opposition to
wilderness and park proposals, not on the merits of those proposals, but solely on the grounds
of the loss of governments shares of revenues and fees from the Federal lands involved").
87. See S. REP. No. 1444, supra note 25, at 3741-42, for a history of this era.
88. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
89. Tax immunity given to parties contracting with the Atomic Energy Commission was

need for revenue and the federal need for unimpaired operations.
Although payments in lieu of tax statutes address the issues of federal tax immunity more directly than do revenue sharing statutes,
they nevertheless have similar inadequacies.
2. Defects of PILOT Programs.-Payments in lieu of tax statutes do not generally provide full tax equivalency. The tax level that
the property could attain if it were in private ownership exceeds the
payments under the statutes. 90 The programs are administered

through various agencies 9' and employ various methods of assessment. 92 Payments may have little relation to potential tax yield except a broad provision that the maximum payment may not exceed
the taxes that could be collected if local assessments and property tax
rates were applied.93 Statutory language of PILOT legislation is

often vague, stating merely that the administering agency should
make an "appropriate" amount of payment. 94 Some agencies consider benefits from the federal presence and reduce payments accordingly. 95
PILOT legislation improves upon revenue sharing legislation by
removing restrictions on the uses to which local governments may
apply funds. PILOT statutes typically provide that the political subdivision bearing the primary burden of federal immunity receives
payment, and specify that the state recipient has a duty to forward
any payments to the appropriate local unit.96 PILOT statutes generally reflect congressional cognizance of the direct burdens imposed
on subnational governments and of the importance of local fiscal
self-determination.
repealed after intensive lobbying by affected states. See Note, The Supreme Court'sRole In the
Administrationof Governmental Tax Immunity, 30 IND. L.J. 341, 346 (1955).
90. Contra 43 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) (provision for full tax equivalency payments for the
Trinity River Basin Project).
91. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 577g (1976) (Department of Agriculture); 16 U.S.C. § 835c-1
(1976) (Department of the Interior); 33 U.S.C. 986 (1976) (Department of Transportation).
92. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 577g (1976) (land appraised by Secretary of Agriculture at tenyear intervals); 33 U.S.C. § 986 (1976) (local assessment); 42 U.S.C. § 2208 (1976) (assessed
value of land at time of acquisition).
93. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 835c-1 (1976).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2208 (1976). The advisability of allowing decisions on payment amounts
to rest in the executive department is questionable. Congress is the only qualified body to
protect the state interests involved, whereas administering officers are likely to be more concerned with the costs of federal programs. Cf. Tribe, supra note 41, at 711. Tribe states that
"ad hoc executive determinations" regarding tax immunity issues are dangerous. Id. A procedure allowing the executive to act first, subject to a check by Congress, "would set political
inertia against state institutional interests, a result making it unlikely that those interests will
be adequately protected." Id. at n. 137.
95. Whether benefits should be considered and possibly affect reductions in payments is
arguable. See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
96. See, e.g., Act of Dec. 22, 1944, ch. 665, § 13, 58 Stat. 887, 905 (1944). The provision
for payments under this program is not classified to the United States Code, however, and
therefore no payments have been made since the statute's enactment. See ADvISORY COMMISSION, supra note 5, ch. II at 28.

IV.
A.

The 1976 PILOT Act
Coverage of theAct

1. Eligibility - "EntitlementLands" -Approximately 92% of
the 760 million public acres are included in the provisions of the
1976 PILOT Act. 97 ,Lands that are eligible for payment under the
Act are defined as "entitlement lands."9 8 The House Subcommittee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, which unanimously recommended
the bill, selected the- included entitlement lands because they have
the "greatest impact on the fiscal health of local governments and
create the vast majority of problems relating to tax immunity.'" 99
t
The majority of this land is located in the western United States,'
but a significant amount of entitlement land lies in the east.' 0
In selecting lands to be included, Congress emphasized the burdens imposed by the federal presence and deemphasized the benefits. 10 2 The floor debates in the House of Representatives indicated
that benefits from certain entitlement lands accrue to the people of
the United States and that the maintenance of these lands is in the
national interest. 10 3 The costs, therefore, should be borne nationwide, not by the locality containing the national park or forest
land."o National park lands were included'0 5 despite the benefits of
tourism associated with them. Congress was not persuaded that the
"unquantified and indirect benefits"'" accruing from tourism compensated for the concomitant increased demand for services that
tourism entailed. The most sensible decision was to include park
lands at the risk of overcompensating certain communities in which
benefits outweigh btirdens. 107
97. Payment In Lieu of Taxes Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-565, 90 Stat. 2662 (codified at
31 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1607 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)) [hereinafter referred to as PILOT Act].
98. 31 U.S.C. § 1606(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) provides that entitlement lands include
lands that are:
(I) within the National Park System, the National Forest System...
(2) administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the Bureau of Land
Management;
(3) dedicated to the use of water resource development projects of the United
States;
(4) [L]ands on which are located semiactive or inactive installations, not including industrial installations, retained by the Army for mobilization purposes and for
support of reserve component training; or
(5) dredge disposal areas owned by the United States under the jurisdiction of
the Army Corps of Engineers ....
99. 122 CONG. REC. 8385 (1976) (remarks of Mr. Weaver).
100. See 1975 Hearings,supra note 6, at 107 (remarks of Mr. Martenay) (the approach of
the PILOT Act is ideally suited to the remote, rural, western areas).
101. See 122 CONG. REC. 8386 (1976) (remarks of Mr. Weaver) (over 30% of the payments
under the PILOT Act go to eastern states).
102. Id at 8400.
103. Id
104. Id
105. See 31 U.S.C. § 1606(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
106. S.REP. No. 94-1262, supra note 9, at 5976.
107. Representatives from the executive branch testified before Congress and argued that

2. Recipient Units of Local Government.-The Payment In
Lieu of Taxes Act compensates local, not state government 0 8 for the
negative fiscal impact of federal tax immunity. The Act anticipates
situations in which concurrent jurisdiction over entitlement land exists, and specifies that the smaller of the two units of government
shall receive payments. 0 9 The rationale is that the unit of government most directly burdened should be the recipient." 0 This is a
major improvement over revenue sharing programs that make states
the recipients of funds.I' It recognizes not only that the unit of government in whose jurisdiction entitlement land is situated is most
burdened with providing services, but also that the same amount of
land taken from a smaller as opposed to a larger unit of government
will affect the tax base of the former more than that of the latter.
The Act further provides that the recipient unit of government may
allocate funds received for any governmental purpose," 2 allowing
full exercise of local budgetary power.
3. Payment Formulas.-The 1976 PILOT Act utilizes four different payment concepts: the guaranteed minimum payment;' 13 the
flat fee per acre; f '1 payment ceilings;' 5 and additional payments for
6
lands acquired for particular federal uses." 1
(a.) Guaranteed minimum payments.-Subnational
governments containing entitlement lands that produce no revenue or inadequate revenue-are given a guaranteed minimum payment under the
Act." 7 Local governments are assured of at least minimal relief
from the fiscal burdens associated with entitlement lands located
within their jurisdictions.
The members of Congress were acutely aware of the inadequacies of revenue sharing when they devised the guaranteed minimum
padyment," 8 which seeks to avoid the unpredictability of revenue
the Act should not be passed because certain areas could be unjustly enriched and needy areas
could be ignored. Further study of these potential problems was urged, but several legislators
rejoined that the bill was the best possible solution and that additional study was unjustified.
See 1975 Hearings,supra note 6, at 220.
108. 31 U.S.C. § 1601, 1606(c) (1976 & Supp. 1II 1979).
109. Id § 1602(d).
110. See S. REP. No. 94-1262, supra note 9, at 5980.
111. See note 84 and accompanying text supra
112. 31 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976 & Supp. Ill 1979). See Kendall v. Towns County, 247 S.E.2d
577, 579 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (because 31 U.S.C. § 1601 provides that allocated funds may be
used for any governmental purpose, a local recipient government may distribute a portion of
its funds to a school district).
113. See 31 U.S.C. § 1602(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
114. Id
115. Id § 1602(b)(1) & (b)(2).
116. Id § 1603.
117. Id § 1602(a).
118. See S. REP. No. 94-1262, supra note 9, at 5971 (no reform of revenue sharing statutes
could cure the basic defects of the system, so a comprehensive payments program was needed).

sharing yields," 9 restrictions on use of funds, 20 and over-compensation to localities already funded adequately.12 ' The payment formulas respond to these inadequacies but allow simple and inexpensive
administration.
(b.) Flatfeeperacre.-The Act provides that each unit of local
government containing entitlement land shall receive seventy-five
cents annually for each acre, reduced by the amount of any funds
received under other payments programs, 22 or ten cents for each
acre of entitlement land. 23 These provisions avoid unpredictability
through the use of a uniform fee per acre, and thereby facilitate local
fiscal planning. Use of a flat fee per acre also obviates the need for a
bureaucracy to perform time-consuming and expensive assessment
24
functions.'
(c.) Payment ceilings.-Section 2 of the Act applies a per capita maximum payment factor to modify the flat fee per acre calculation. 25 This provision assures that public lands that are sparsely
populated and less in need of funds do not receive windfall benefits.' 26 Units of government with populations of less than 5000 have
a fifty dollar per capita limit. No unit of local government can be
credited with a population of more than 50,000 residents, even if its
actual population is above that figure. The per capita limit at this
119. See 122 CONG. REC. 8392 (1976) (remarks of Mr. McCormack) (PILOT Act will
insure that payments will not fluctuate).,
120. Id
121. See 31 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1976 & Supp. 111 1979), which provides in part: "No unit of
local government which receives any payment with respect to any land under the Act of August 28, 1937 (50 Stat. 875), or the Act of May 24, 1939 (53 Stat. 753). . . shall be eligible to
receive any payment under this chapter . . . with respect to such land."
The Senate Report to the PILOT Act explains that these excluded lands currently receive
revenue sharing payments that are "clearly adequate." S. REP. No. 94-1262, supra note 9, at
5983.
122. 31 U.S.C. § 1602(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The seventy-five cents figure is a
ceiling but does not affect those counties already in receipt of a larger amount under revenue
sharing statutes. See 122 CONG. REC. 17751 (1976) (remarks of Mr. Moss).
123. 31 U.S.C. § 1602(a)(2). The ten cents per acre provision allows recipients of inadequate revenue sharing funds to choose the ten cents per acre alternative if that figure is larger
than the seventy-five cents per acre figure minus payments received through revenue sharing.
S. REP. No. 94-1262, supra note 9, at 5980. The ten cents figure is subject to the payment
ceiling. See notes 125-128 and accompanying text infra.
124. Congress considered the repeal of all revenue sharing programs and the establishment of a unitary system based on full tax equivalency payments, but rejected this notion
because it would require assessment of all federal property, an expensive and time consuming
task. S. REP. No. 94-1262, supra note 9, at 5974.
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has recommended that the
systems for inventory and assessment of federal real property be improved. Advisory Commission, supra note 5, ch. I at 46. The Commission found that there was no inventory of the
total value of tax-immune federal property. Id at 7.
125. 31 U.S.C. § 1602(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. II1 1979).
126. Population is determined on "the same basis as resident population is determined by
the Bureau of the Census for general statistical purposes." Id § 1602(c).

population level is twenty dollars, thus establishing a total payment
ceiling of one million dollars.
One advantage of a maximum payment provision is that the upper limit on federal costs is set. Basing the maximum payment on
population may produce inequitable results, however, in counties
that receive seasonal influxes of tourists.' 2 7 These counties are not
credited with a temporary increase in population to raise the payment ceiling, although the costs of services for the transient population is independent of the costs of services for the permanent
population.128 These communities represent a small percentage of
total recipients and it is administratively infeasible for Congress to
devise an individual fee formula for each area. Therefore, use of the
per capita formula is justified by the ease of its administration.
(d) Additional payment formulas.-Section 3 of the PILOT
Act requires that one percent of the fair market value of lands acquired for certain purposes' 29 be paid to counties containing entitlement lands. Under this provision, counties must distribute the one
percent payment
to affected units of local government and school
30
1
districts.
Although an assessment of acquired lands is necessary to compute payments, there are no added costs because these lands are assessed during the acquisition process. 13 ' The payments are made
only for land acquired after a certain date, 32 they apply only if the
land was subject to taxation within five years preceding acquisition 133 and they continue for only five years after acquisition. 34 Rezoning that increases the land's value does not increase the
payments, which are computed as if the land had not been rezoned. 3 The maximum additional payment under section 3 is the
amount of property tax that was collected in the fiscal year prior to
36
acquisition.
Section 3 responds to the serious effects of abrupt withdrawal of
previously taxed land from local tax rolls. 13 It applies to lands that
127. See 1975 Hearings, supra note 6, at 50 (remarks of Mr. Buckler).
128. Id
129. 31 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1976 & Supp. III. 1979).
130. Id The mandate that counties make payments to school districts was added "to make
it clear that when a school district has lost tax revenue from an acquisition of previously taxed
land ... the school system would qualify as a unit of local government. . . for distribution of
payments." 122 CONG. REc. 8406 (1976) (remarks of Mr. Seiberling).
131. S. REP. No. 94-1262, supra note 9, at 5981.
132. 31 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (payments apply only to land acquired
after December 31, 1970).
133. Id
134. Id § 1603(d).
135. Id § 1603(c)(I).
136. Id
137. See 122 CONG. REC. 8383 (1976) (remarks of Mr. Seiberling) (although the presence

must undergo development before any possible offsetting benefits
can accrue to the local economy and provides relief for the interim
period.
B.

The Promulgation of Regulations Under the 1976 PILOTAct

1. Identification of Payment Recipients.-The Secretary of the
Interior is authorized to administer the Act,' 3 including the essential
task of identification of payment recipients. An improper identification may defeat the Act's purpose of easing the effect of tax immunity on the smallest units of local government. Identification of the
proper local government recipient is governed by section 2(d) of the
Act, which clearly states that if entitlement land is within the jurisdiction of two units of government, payment shall be made to the
39
smaller unit.
The regulations define "government" as:
lAin organized entity having substantial autonomy and whose officers are either popularly elected or appointed by publicly elected
officials. Other indicia of governmental character include (1) a
high degree of responsibility to the public for performance of duties of a governmental nature, (2) power to levy taxes, and (3)
power to issue debt paying interest exempt from Federal taxation.'4
Local governments possessing these characteristics are eligible
for PILOT funds. Further regulations issued by the Department of
the Interior, however, function to deprive appropriate recipients of
payments. 141
2. Improper Regulations.-The process of identification of recipients should include two steps: application of the Secretary's definition of "government" and a determination of the smaller of two
units eligible under that definition. The regulations, however, have
incorporated a weighing process into the identification procedure
that enables the Secretary to disregard the clear mandate of section
2(d) of the Act by allowing payment to be made to the larger of two
units of government with concurrent jurisdiction over entitlement
lands.
of federal lands may be beneficial in the long run, local governments need assistance to "tide
them over in the transition phase").
138. 30 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
139. Id § 1602(d). This section provides:
In the case of a smaller unit of local government all or part of which is located
within another unit of local government, entitlement lands which are within the jurisdiction of both such units shall be treated for purposes of this section as only within
the jurisdiction of such smaller unit.
140.

43 C.F.R. § 1881.0-5(a) (1979).

141. See notes 142-47 and accompanying text infra.

The "principal provider" test' 4 2 allows the bypassing of the
smaller unit of government. The executive department determined
that to receive payments, a unit of government must be the principal
43
provider of services affecting the use of federal entitlement lands.'
The effect of this determination has been succinctly described by one
federal district court in Pennsylvania:
The effect of the regulations is that section 1602(d) can never come
into play: Two units of local government can never have concurrent jurisdiction over entitlement lands because only one unit can
ever be the principal provider. The Department's regulations
have effectively excised section 1602(d) from the Act.'
A federal court in Michigan has reached the opposite result,
holding that the effect of section 2(d) as written may be inequitable
because it could result in the receipt of payments by a smaller unit of
government "irrespective of whether there is a higher level of general government which has been adversely affected by the location of
federal entitlement lands within its borders."' 4 5 The court further
held that the Secretary's principal provider test found support in the
legislative history of the Act and, therefore, could be applied even if
it resulted in payment to a larger eligible government rather than a
smaller one. 146

The Pennsylvania court correctly concluded that the clear
meaning of section 2(d) is that payments should go to the smaller of
two eligible units of government. The members of Congress were
aware of the possible inequitable results with which the Michigan
142. Id § 1881.0-5(b)(l), which provides in part that unit of general government means a
"unit of that type of government which, within its state, is the principal provider of governmental services affecting the use of entitlement lands."
143. The Chief of the Division of Finance of the Bureau of Land Management, who formulated the principal provider test, explained its origins:
Initially I determined, with guidance from the Office of the Solicitor, that section
2(d) of the Act did not require that payments be made to townships if they were a
smaller unit of local government within which 'entitlement lands' were located, and
that the correct test to be applied to determine what unit within a state should be paid
was, as stated in the regulations . . . , to decide whether a unit of government is 'a
unit of that type of government which, within its state, is the principal provider of
governmental services affecting the use of entitlement lands'.
Memorandum of Defendant, Affidavit of Edward P. Greenberg, at I, Penn Twp. v. United
No. 79-1023 (M.D. Pa., May 6, 1980), vacated, No. 79-1023 (M.D. Pa. July
States Dep't of Int.,
2, 1980).
There is no support for this position in the provisions of the PILOT Act or its legislative
No. 79-1023, slip op. at 15-17 (M.D. Pa.,
history. See Penn Twp. v. United States Dep't of Int.,
May 6, 1980).
144. Id at 5. The district court order in Penn Township was vacated by the parties consent. Penn Township agreed to vacate when the Department offerred to pay the funds to the
township and not appeal the district court's decision that the smaller unit of government is the
proper recipient of funds under the Act. Consent Order, No. 79-1023 (M.D. Pa., July 2, 1980).
145. Meade Twp. v. Andrus, No. G77-496, slip op. at 9-10 (W.D. Mich., Oct. 31, 1979).
146. Id at 8. The legislative history cited by the court in support of its interpretation of
section 2(d) consisted only of statements of legislators and not of the official report accompanying the Act. See Brief for Plaintiff, at 7, Penn Twp. v. Dep't of the Interior, No. 79-1023
(M.D. Pa., May 6, 1980).

court was concerned, yet did not alter the Act.' 4 7 The regulations
should, therefore, be amended to remove the principal provider test,
which contravenes the plain meaning of the Act and promotes needless litigation.
3. 1978 Amendments. -The 1976 PILOT Act was broadened
in 1978 to apply to two additional revenue sharing programs to supplement the payments received under those programs. 4 8 The extension creates confusion in interpretation of section 3, providing for
additional payments at one percent of the fair market value of acquired lands. ' 49 Ambiguity is created by a provision stating that the
additional payments under this section may be carried forward to
future years in certain circumstances. 5 ° The 1976 Act's five-year
limit on payments is apparently inapplicable under the 1978 amendments.
Another potential source of difficulty is that payments shall be
made "only to the extent sufficient data is available to determine the
amount due the qualified units of local government."'' Potentially
inequitable delay in the receipt of payments is possible under this
regulation. Incomplete information may present an impediment to
payment because federal agencies or states have acted inefficiently. 52 Local governments should not be deprived of payments
147. The Department of the Interior and other executive agencies opposed enactment of
the Act. See note 107 and accompanying text supra. The Department, in a letter to Senator
Henry Jackson, recommended:
[Blefore meaningful and equitable improvements can be made in the present systems
used to share receipts from Federal lands, a comprehensive study would have to be
made to assure that changes which are beneficial to some state and local governments
do not create even more serious inequities for other state and local governments or
for the Federal government.
S. REP. No. 94-1262, supra note 9, at 5991.
The suggestion that further studies were necessary was not well-received in the House
hearings. See 1975 Hearings,supra note 6, at 235 (remarks of Mr. Santini) ("With regard to
[the] proposed study, I am only apprehensive that the Public Land Law Review Commission
did a 5-year study costing $7 million, which concluded that basic fairness required some in lieu
.
reimbursement. . . .I apprehend we could be studying this for time immemorial ..
148. See 16 U.S.C. § 79(o) (Supp. 11 1978) and 16 U.S.C. § 668d (Supp. 11 1978).
149. See notes 129-137 and accompanying text supra.
150. 16 U.S.C. § 79(o)(c) (Supp. 11 1978) provides that payments not made under section 3
of the Act because of the provision limiting payments to the property taxes collected the year
before acquisition "shall be carried forward and shall be applied to future years in which this
portion of the total payment would not otherwise equal the amount of real property taxes
assessed .. "
151. 43 C.F.R. § 1881.1-4 (1979).
152. Because most revenue sharing payments are made to states and the amount of these
payments is subtracted from payments under the PILOT Act, the states must provide the Department of the Interior with the amount of payments received. 16 U.S.C. § 1602(a)(2) (1976
& Supp. III 1979). Government audits performed in 1979 found that most states had been
furnishing inaccurate information to the Department. 45 Fed. Reg. 47618 (1980). The regulations were amended in 1980 to require that states' reports be audited as a condition precedent
to payment. Id at 47619 (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 1881.1-2). There may be a delay in
payments to local governments because of the audit requirement.

for this reason, but should be provided a minimal payment under the
Act until the lack of information is remedied.
V.

Conclusion

The development of payments programs to compensate for the
tax immunity of federal land has not changed the basic concepts of
federalism expounded by Justice Marshall in 1819. Federal
supremacy remains intact but its maintenance is less fiscally burdensome to subnational governments. Political and economic ramifications of the supremacy doctrine have provided impetus for action by
Congress, which is the appropriate body to evaluate the delicate intergovernmental fiscal issues.
The Payment In Lieu of Taxes Act of 1976 and its legislative
history indicate congressional sensitivity to the burdens placed on
local governments by federal retention and acquisition of land. Furthermore, the Act directly addresses the inadequacies of prior legislation. Although it is neither a panacea for local governments' fiscal
ills nor an administratively perfect system, the Act responds in a
comprehensive manner to the most crucial area of concern: the need
for minimum payments for affected localities and the funneling of
monies directly to the smallest, most directly affected governmental
units. Although the Act is not as easy to administer as Congress may
have envisioned, modification of the executive department's regulations and clarification of the 1978 amendments would foster proper
implementation. A workable system exists within the framework of
the PILOT Act. "The mere fact of complex and competing state and
federal interests should not produce legislative paralysis."' 5 3 The
Act is a testament to congressional efforts to reconcile those competing interests.
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